ETHNIC POWER SHARING: THREE BIG PROBLEMS

Authors

  • Donald L Horowitz Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, United States Author

Keywords:

Ethnic Power, Sharing, Problems, Consociational

Abstract

Societies are severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, language, or any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions that make democracy difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Two commonly proposed methods of amelioration are called consociational and centripetal. Three problems derive from these proposals: The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either be adopted? The second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalition. The third, derives from a common consequence of the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce. By examining these three problems, we can uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the common prescriptions.

References

Ackerman. 1991. We the People: Foundations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin. 2005. Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Andrew Reynolds, ed.,. 2002. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Backward, A. S. 2013. Journal of Democracy 24 (October 2013).
Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, art. 134 (2).
Downes, A. B. 2004. “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars”, Security Studies 13 (Summer 2004)
Ginsburg, T. 2003. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guan, L. H. 2013. “Steadily Amplified Rural Votes Decide Malaysian Elections”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 34, Singapore, 6 June 2013.
Horowitz, D. L. “Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes,” in Reynolds, The Architecture of Democracy: “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” Nomor 42 (2000) “Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States,” William and Mary Law Review 49 (March 2008).
_______. 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press.
_______. 2013. Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ian S. Spears, “Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power”, Third World Quarterly 21 (February 2000).
Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss,. 1998. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kingdon, Agendas John W. 1995. Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. New York: Harper Collins.
Koole, R. and Hans Daalder. 2002. “The Consociational Democracy Model and the Netherlands: Ambivalent Allies?” Acta Politica 37 (Spring–Summer 2002).
Laurent de Briey. 2005. “Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote” (unpubl. ms., 2005), www.paviagroup.be/documents/de-Briey.06.Centripetalism.pdf.
LeVan, A.C. 2011. “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies”, Governance 24 (January 2011).
Lijphart, A. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lim Hong Hai. 1997. “The Malayan Electoral System: Its Formulation and Change”, Ph.D diss., University of Malaya.
Luther, K. R. and Wolfgang C. Muller, eds.,. 1992. Politics in Austria: Still a Case of Consociationalism?. London: Frank Cass.
McCrudden, C. and Brendan O’Leary. 2013. Courts and Consociations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nordlinger, E. 1972. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs.
Ostwald, Kai. 2013. “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General Election”, Round Table 102 (December 2013).
Pierre du Toit. 2003 “Why Post-Settlement Settlements?” Journal of Democracy 14 (July 2003).
Ramseyer, J. M. 1994. “The Puzzling (In) dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach”, Journal of Legal Studies 23 (June 1994).
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reilly,B. 2006. “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, Democratization 13 (December 2006).
Roeder, P. G. 2005. “Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies”, in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sisk, Timothy. 2010. “The Obsolescing Pact: The Limits of Power sharing in Sustaining Post War Peace,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, 2010.
Spears. 2002. “Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing”, Journal of Democracy 13 (July 2002).
Wilkinson, S. I. 2005. “Conditionality, Consociationalism, and the European Union”, in Sid Noel, ed., From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queens University Press.
Wilkinson. 2003. “Conditionality, Consociationalism, and the European Union”.

Published

2014-09-25

How to Cite

Horowitz, D. L. (2014). ETHNIC POWER SHARING: THREE BIG PROBLEMS. Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun, 2(3), 1-22. https://journal.scadindependent.org/index.php/jipeuradeun/article/view/36